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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLATR R. ROGERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRANCES ,J. ROGERS ANDREWS, 
Dde lldant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11875 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order and Decree of 
the District Court modifying the Decree of Divorce here-
tofore made and t>ntered, by awarding the permanent 
custody of the two minor children of the parties to the 
father with the right of the mother to have the custody 
of said children for one day and one night each wt>ek. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
By a Decree of Divorce made and entered in 1961, 
the custody of the two minor children was awarded to 
the Defendant with visitation rights to the Plaintiff. 
Although there were a number of restraining orders 
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compelling the Plaintiff to visit the children only in the 
presence of the Defendant, who was their mother, the 
parties worked out an agreement whereby the children 
had overnight visitations each week with the Plaintiff. 
This arrangement continued until June 10, 19u9, wlwn 
the Plaintiff filed an affidavit, and pursuant thereto an 
Order to Show Cause was issued on June 16, 1969, 
wherein the Plaintiff sought to have the custody of the 
children changed. The youngest of the two minor chil-
dren had in May of 1969 reached the age of ten years 
and based on Section 30-3-10 and Section 30-3-5, of the 
Utah Code Annotated, which has now been rewritten, 
Plaintiff contended that both the children had reached 
the age of ten years and were therefore entitled to select 
1he parent to which each child would attach himself. On 
the 18th of June, after a hearing in which both parties 
were present and presented evidence, the Court took 
the matter under advisement and on the 24th day of 
June, 1969, modified the Decree by awarding to the 
father, the custody of the children during the summer 
months only, from June until September, with the right 
of the Defendant to visit with said children over night 
one day each week. Late in August, 1969, Plaintiff reg-
istered the boys in the elementary school and junior 
high school of Plaintiff's district. (Tr. 23). On the 2nd 
day of September when Defendant attempted to get 
the children back to register them in their proper district 
where she resides, to-wit, in Sunset, Davis County, Utah, 
considerable difficulty and unpleasantness arose and shr 
was required to obtain the assistance of the Juvenile 
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Court officer to enforce the order of the District Court 
('J'r. 23-27-51). 'rhereafter, Defendant took the boys to 
her home and prepared to send them to their schools in 
her district. She registered them in the Sunset schools 
(Tr. 53). After spending the night of September 3rd in 
her home, the boys on September 4th left for school. They 
did not attend the schools in which they were registered, 
however, but instead, called a certain woman who was 
the sister of the Plaintiff's present wife (Tr. 123-125). 
She picked the boys up and took them to her apartment 
and kept them from contacting the Defendant during the 
entire day. After numerous calls to the Plaintiff and the 
Police Department and Sheriff's office, the children at 
10 :30 p.m. were located in the home of the Plaintiff 
(Tr. 58), by a Juvenile Court officer of Weber County. 
When she was informed of the situation, Defendant con-
sented to having the Juvenile Court officer take them 
into his custody until the following morning. When she 
went for the children at 10 :00 a.m. the next day, Plain-
tiff had obtained an exparte order, changing the custody 
of the children from the mother to the father. The De-
fendant came to the chambers of the Honorable Charles 
G. Cowley, the District Judge who had heard this matter, 
with an affidavit and an Order prepared by her attorney 
in line with the previous Decree of June 24, 1969. At 
that time Judge Cowley made a Minute Order as follows: 
"Defendant's requested Order submitted to 
the judge in chambers at about 4 :15 p.m., Friday, 
September 5, 1969, for custody of the two boys, 
in the opinion of the Court is well taken; however, 
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beeamw th(• }waring- i:-; hut on<' \YPek awa)- and 
for th<' further reason that the transfer of thP 
bo)-s back and forth might havP some impact on 
thl'm, therefore the Court refrains from signing 
tlw ordPr at this timP, and the boys may remain 
with the father until the hearing September 15, 





Thereafter, a Petition was filed by the Plaintiff, re-
questing the modification of the Decree of Divorce to 
change the custody. On September 18 the matter came 
on for hearing. After both sides had presented a number 
of witnesses, the Court took the matter under advisement 
and on September 24, made and cnkred its order grant-
ing permanent custody of the two boys to the Plaintiff 
with the right of defendant to have overnight \Tisits once 
each week. It is from this Order that the Defendant 
appeals. 
Thereafter, Defendant filed a further Affidavit and 
Motion, asking the Court to fix a definite time for her 
overnight visits, the Plaintiff having failed and refused 
to give her any definite time in which to have said minor 
ehildren with her. After a hearing on this matter on 
the 14th day of October, tlw Court, after considerable 
discussion (Tr. 26) fixed a definite period of time for 
Defendant's ovPrnight visits. 
5 
RELIEF 80UGH1' ON THE RULING 
The appeal asks this Court to reverse the ruling of 
tl1e 'L1ria1 Court denying her Motion of Se1Jtember 5 in 
which she requested the Court to enforce its prior De-
eree and to vacate and set aside the and later 
permanent order which it had made granting the Plain-
tiff custody of said minor children with only Defendant's 
right to visit them overnight on week ends ('rr. 20). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ever since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
two little boys grew up in the home of the Defendant in 
an apparently normal fashion. Defendant, after certain 
nnpleasant matters with the Plaintiff were straightened 
out, and after the boys reached an age that they were able 
to care for themselves, permitted them to have weekly 
overnight visits with the Plaintiff. During that time, how-
ever, Plaintiff let it be known on a number of occasions 
that he would make every effort to get the children away 
from the Defendant once they reached the age of ten 
years. He apparently pointed his efforts toward the time 
when the youngest boy would reach the age of ten years 
and based upon the Sections of the Statntei, herein re-
ferred to was determined to obtain the custody of the 
children upon the youngest one's reaching the age of 
ten years. Therefore, in June, on Order to Show Cause 
was issued to determine whether or not the Court should 
change the custody of the children. There was no effort 
on the part of the Plaintiff to show an unfitness upon 
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the part of the mother, the Defendant herein, to have 
the custody. This Plaintiff's whole Petition was based 
on the fact that the youngest child was now ten years of 
age, and that therefore they were entitled to select the 
parent to which they would attach themselves. Both of 
the boys expressed a desire to the Court in the Chambers 
to go with their father. Therefore, the Court on June 
24 modified the Decree of Divorce by giving the custody 
of the boys to the Plaintiff during the summer months, 
with overnight visits to the mother, the Defendant, dur-
ing June, July, and August. During that time the boys 
were taken on numerous smnmer picnics, motor boat 
parties, and Defendant had a considerable amount of 
trouble getting her overnight visits. Early in August 
Plaintiff, while he had the boys in his custody, brought 
t11em to the home of the Defendant, rang the doorbell 
of the Defendant, and when she appeared, stated to her: 
"The boys have something to tell yon" (Tr. 20). The 
boys then proceeded to tell the Defendant that they were 
not coming home. Plaintiff then left with the children. 
On August 18, while the boys were still in the custody of 
the Plaintiff, he took them and registered them in a 
junior high school and an elementary school in his Dis-
trict. When the 2nd of September arrived, Defendant 
went to get the children and was unable to do so. After 
considerable difficulty with the Plaintiff, she obtained a 
certified copy of the last Order of the Court and with 
a Juvenile Court officer went to the schools and took 
the boys out, drove them to the schools in Sunset, Davis 
County, Utah, and registered them there in her own 
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District (Tr. 75-78). After spending one night in her 
home, the boy:_ left for school but did not go to school 
Instead, they telephoned one Ann Bodily, who was a 
sister of the present Mrs. Rogers. She had them taken 
to her apartment and kept them during the entire day 
(Tr. 34). Plaintiff, at 10 :45 p.rn. called the Defendant 
and told her that he had the boys in his home. Defendant 
then called a Juvenile Court officer in Ogden, who took 
the boys with the consent of the Defendant into his 
custody until the following morning. When the Defend-
ant went for the children, she discovered that Judge 
Cowley had made a temporary ex parte order awarding 
them back to the father for the winter months (Tr. 105). 
8he was also informed that the children were then back 
in Plaintiff's custody. An Affidavit and Petition were 
filed and after a hearing on September 18, the Court 
took the matter under advisement and on September 24 
made and thereafter entered an Order changing the 
pennanent custody of the boys to the father, the Plaintiff, 
with the right of the Defendant to have overnight visits 
with the boys once a week. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TH.1£ '1,RIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
AN ORDER CHANGING THE CUSTODY 
FROM THE MOTHER, DEFENDANT, TO 
THE PLAINTIFF, FATHER. 
About the only basis and reason for the Court's 
changing the custody of the children in its order of 
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September 24, was the fact that the children wanted to 
go with their father. There was no showing at any 
time that the Defendant had been anything other than 
a good, conscientious, devoted mother to these boys. She 
had made as honest effort to make their life as normal 
and happy as possible under the circmnstances and had 
voluntarily permitted them to have weekly overnight 
visits with the Plaintiff. During all of this time and 
while they were visiting with their father, the boys were 
systematically turned away from their mother. They 
had been given considerable leeway and freedom while in 
the custody of their father and of course were for sev-
Pra.l years merely overnight guests of the Plaintiff. He 
had no responsibility in the raising and disciplining of 
the boys and they had a party each week end with him 
on their visits. We 'Submit that the prime consideration 
in this case should not be the desires of the children, 
but the Court must be guided as to the welfare and the 
best interests of the children, and the persona.I desires 
of the parent and of said children must yield to determine 
·what is best for the children's ultimate good. Larkin vs. 
Lr1rki11, (1963), 85 Idaho 610, 382 Pac.2nd 784. 
"It was held in Larkin v. Larkin (1963), 85 
Idaho 610, 382 P2d 784, that in determining which 
of tlw parties to a divon'<' action should have thP 
of a minor child, the paramount consid-
eration hv which th<' court must lw guided is the 
welfarti best interest:,; of the child, and that 
the personal desires of th<' parent, and even the 
wishes of the minor child, mnst yield to the de-
termination of "·hat is best for the child's ultimate 
good. 
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In Berkshire v. Caley (1901), 157 Ind. 1, 60 
NE 696, it was held that the wishes or desires of 
an infant of discretion, in respect to its custody, 
are frequently considered by the trial court, not 
because such infant has the legal right to demand 
that its wishes be regarded, but because it is 
proper for the court to be informed relative 
thereto, in order that it may be better prepared 
to wisely exercise its discretion upon the question 
of the custody of such child; the court also stated, 
however, that the trial court was not to be influ-
enced in any degree by the mere whims of the 
infant, but could have regard for its feelings, 
attachments, and reasonable preferments, and its 
probable contentment and happiness, incidental to 
its custody. In the instant case, the court appar-
ently gave considerable weight to the preference 
of a 9-year-old child." 
"While holding that the expression of desire 
of an infant of 8 years as to which parent it would 
rather live with may be given consideration the 
court in Bowman v. Bowman (1950), 313 Ky. 806, 
233 SW2d 1020, held that such expressions of 
desire were not binding on the court, which must 
look to the welfare of the child rather than to its 
desires." 
"The court in Graves v. Wooden (1956, Mo. 
App.), 291 SW2d 665, recognized that a child's 
wishes, although entitled to consideration, are not 
to be indulged if they are inconsistent with the 
attainment of the paramount objective, that is, 
furtherance of the child's welfare." 
In 4 ALR 3rd, 1410, we find this interesting anno-
tation: 
"The polestar by which the courts are to be 
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guided whenever they consider tht> question of a 
child's custody is the best interest and welfare 
of the child. The dominant thought is that chil-
dren are not chattels, but intelligent and moral 
beings, and as such, tht>ir interest and welfarr 
are of first consideration. All other considera-
tions, including the wishes of tht> child, must yield 
to the child's overall welfart> . 
. . . In ToblPr Y. 'I'oblPr (1956), 78 Idaho 218, 
299 P2d 490, it was held that while the wish of 
the child to be awarded to one of the parents 
where the parents wt>re separated and both parties 
were shown to be suitable persons to have the 
custody was not finally determinative of the is-
sues, it was a proper matter for a trial court to 
consider with other evidPnct> in determining the 
child's best interest, the court taking the position 
that the wishes of the child must yield to the 
determination of what is best for such child's 
ultimate good." 
In 4 ALR 3rd, p. 1412: 
"Although practically all cases in which the 
Court refuses to give effect to the child's wishes 
may impliedly stand for the principle that such 
wishes are subordinate to the child's best interests, 
this subsection includes only those cases, not 
stated in specific connnections indicated by appro-
priate headings elsewhere in the annotation, 
which are illustrative of the courts' disregard of 
the child's wishes, in view of thP presence of 
objective factors affecting its welfare which were 
contrary to its wishes. 
While recognizing that a child, who by reason 
of its years is capablf' of indicating a preference 
regarding custody, is entitled to express its views, 
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to which a court will always give careful consid-
Pration, the court in McCullough v. McCullough 
(1953), 222 Ark. 390, 260 SW2d 463, held that 
the expression of a preference was not binding 
upon the court, and that the chancellor would 
look behind mere words, appraise conditions, cir-
cumstances, and contributing factors, and would 
alter an order of custody only when a change 
would be in the minor's best interests. Finding 
that the boy in this case, 15 years of age, had been 
carefully reared in a Christian home where evi-
dence of the slightest di'scord was wholly lacking, 
the court declined to remove the boy from the 
custody of his mother despite the fact that the 
child and had expressed a preference to live with 
his father. 
The court in Anderson v. Anderson (1937), 
122 Conn. 600, 191 A 534, affirmed the decision 
of the trial court, which disregarded the stated 
preference of a 7-year-old child to remain with 
this father and grandfather, because the court 
found that although the child's present happiness 
would best be served by remaining with his father, 
the mother was better equipped to exercise the 
discipline and control which was needed for his 
guidance during the years of hi1s childhood and 
adolescence, and that the care and training which 
she would furnish would be more beneficial to 
him than that given by his father and grand-
father. 
It was held by Abair v. Everly (1959), 130 
Ind. App. 192, 163 NE2d 34, that the fact that 
the children whose custody was at issue, aged 
41;2 and 20 years, had expressed a desire to be 
with their father, raither than to go out of the 
state with their mother, certainly would not con-
12 
stitute a change of conditions warranting a changr 
of a previous decre<> awarding their custod:,' to 
the mother. Tlrns, the court apparently took the 
position that although the v.rishes of children may 
bf' a factor to be considered in a custody proceed-
ing, they are not controlling, and do not of them-
selves represent a sufficient change of conditions 
to warrant a change of a prior custodial decree 
wihch was based upon the childrf'n's best wishes. 
It was held in Lnrsen v. Henrichs (1948), 239 
Iowa 1009, 33 NW2d 383, that although in caseR 
involving the custody of a minor, the desire of 
the minor was to be considered, various other 
factors were not to be lost sight of, such as the 
age of the minor, the length of time the minor had 
lived in the homf' for which the prf'f erencf' was 
stated, the nature of the associations therein, the 
contacts with the one seeking a change of cus-
tody, the relationship and past associations, the 
natural and legal rights of th<> contending parties, 
and any other matters throwing light thereon. 
Taking all of these factors in consideration, the 
court concluded that the wishes of the 11-year-old 
child in the instant case to be placed in the cus-
tody of her mother were not in her best interests, 
and divided the child's custody between her mother 
and grandmother. 
In an action for modification of a custody 
decree, the wishes of two children, one of whom 
was 7 or 8 years old and the other 12 years old, 
were held entitled to less weight than in an orig-
inal hearing on custody in Smith v. Smith 1965), 
Iowa 133 NW2d 677, where the court apparently 
gave more emphasis to the best interests and 
welfare of the children. On appeal by the mother 
from a decree awarding custody of the children 
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to the father during the smruner months although 
the original divorce decree gave custody to the 
mother and restricted the father's visiting rights 
to Saturdays, the father contended that since the 
mother had moved some distance from him in 
order to obtain employment, and since this en-
tailed some extensive traveling on the part of the 
children, he should be granted their custody dur-
ing the summer months. Rejecting this and re-
versing this part of the decree below, the court 
noted that while the children's letters expressed 
love for the father, a dislike for school, and a 
desire to live with him, the mother was providing 
a good home for them, with good supervision for 
them while she was at work both before and after 
school each day, and had moved for the express 
purpose of taking a position which would enable 
her to provide adequately for them, and held that 
as to the younger child, its wishes should be given 
little if any weight, since it was not of an age 
to exercise discretion in choosing a custodian. As 
to the 12-year-old, the court held that its wishes 
should not be given as much consideration in an 
application for change in custody based on alleged 
subsequent change in circumstances as they would 
perhaps be entitled to in an original hearing on 
custody. In this connection, the court pointed 
out that the wishes of both children may well have 
been influenced by the fact that since they had 
spent only Saturdays (nonschool days) with their 
father, they associated homework with their 
mother and that their father may have represented 
an environment free of homework. 
Where it appeared that the mother of the 
child whose custody was at issue was regularly 
employed and apparently in a position to main-
tain the child in a suitable environment, while, on 
14 
the other hand, the father appeared to be some-
what irresponsible and either unwilling or unable 
to a suitable environment for the child, 
the court m HaymPs v. Haymes (1954 Ky.), 269 
SW2d 237, while recognizing that ordinarily in 
custody matters the wishes of a child of the. age 
of the child here involved ( 13 years) were entitled 
to great weight, concluded that under the circum-
stances of this case, the best interest of the child 
would be served by disregarding its expressed 
wish to remain with its father, and by granting its 
custody to the mother. 
It was held in Bmpbacher v. Brupbacher 
(1939), 192 La. 219, 187 So. 555, that the mere 
fact that a 15-year-old girl desired to live with 
her father and her brother, who had been placed 
in her father's custody, did not constitute a suf-
ficient reason to establish that this young girl, 
who needed her mother's guidance and protection, 
should be taken from the custody of her mother, 
a person admittedly fit for such charge, and 
turned over to her father. It also appeared that 
if the girl were to be placed in the custody of her 
father, she would be alone much of the time, since 
her father was a bus driver and was away from 
home a great deal, and her brother was away at 
school. Examining all of these factors, the court 
apparently concluded that the best interest of the 
child would be served by placing her in the cus-
tody of her mother. 
Where it appeared that the nature of the 
father's work was such that he was frequently 
required to be absent from home overnight and 
on weekends, and that his second wife was a 
business-woman, who would be in the home only 
after business hours, the court in Lyckburg v. 
15 
Lyckburg (1962 La. App.), 140 So. 2d 487, con-
cluding that if the children were permitted to 
remain in the custody of their father they would 
•eside in a home that would be to all practical 
purposes, run by a house keeper and a maid, held 
that notwithstanding the expressed desire of the 
children to remain vvith their father, it was settled 
jurisprudence that awards of custody were not 
dependent upon the wishes or desires ·of the chil-
dren, and that since the children's best interests 
would be served by placing them with their 
mother, she was entitled to their custody. 
Where the lower court, out of respect for the 
desires of a 15-year-old boy, had changed the 
custody of the boy from the father to the mother, 
the appellate court in Hartma;n v. Hartman (1925 
Mo. App.), 277 SW 950, held that while the boy's 
wishes were entitled to great weight in deciding 
a matter of this kind, the interest of the child was 
the paramount consideration, and that if the boy's 
condition would be better with his father than 
with his mother, his wishes should not govern. 
Concluding that the interest of the boy would 
best be served by remaining with his father, the 
court reversed the decree of the trial court." 
In the case of Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah 2nd P. 36, 
386 Pac.2nd 900, this Honorable Court in considering 
Section 30-3-5 and Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code 
Annotated which have both been rewritten by he 1969 
legislature found that the child shall have the privilege 
of selecting the divorced parent with whom he wishes 
to live unless the parent was immoral or unfit to have 
custody. However, Mr. Justice Crockett in a strong dis-
senting opinion points out the danger of leaving the 
16 
matter of the custody of the minor children to the whim 
of the chjldren. (P. 39): 
"Further, and more important that the result 
in this case, is the fact that the holding with 
respect to this statute seems to me to completely 
distort its true purpose and reaches a high point 
in forbearance of the judicial prerogative, if not 
an outright abdication of judicial duty. If the 
mere fact that a child has become 10 years old 
endows him with power to make a choice of his 
parental custodian, which must be honored in any 
event, and whether his reasons are good or bad, 
or in fact whether he has any reasons at all, so 
that his choice is absolute and not subject to con-
trol or review by anyone, even by the court, he 
could be empowered to make a decision of the 
gravest possible consequence to himself, his fam-
ily, and society, under circumstances where, be-
cause of his immaturity, and the usual emotional 
stress, there is little assurance that his judgment 
would be sound. It would be one of the most 
arbitrary and far-reaching prerogatives known to 
the law. This is plainly nonsensical and imprac-
tical. 
... It is submitted that if the whole structure 
of the divorce law is looked at in the correct light, 
it will be seen that the clear purpose of the. legi1s-
lature was to grant to the court discretion to 
do what it has always done, i.e., whatever justice 
and equity require in regard to the parties, the 
children and the property rights, and that there 
are a number of reasons why it is unthinkable 
that the legislature intended a 10-year-old child 
to have any such absolute and incontestable 
power. 
17 
Under snd1 a rul<>, pan·nts alread.Y too deeply 
irnmersed in \Voes because tlw family is breaking 
up would haw them added to by having to com-
1wte with each other for the children's choice. 
elaborating thereon it is easy to see the 
hazards to them and to the child this would create. 
8nch a battle might well go to the more unscrup-
nlous, who not be abovP poisoning the child's 
mind against the other; or resorting to coPrcion; 
or showering him 'vith ill-advised gift:,; or favors. 
Even more damaging would be the subjecting of 
a child to such pressures and making him a pawn 
in the contest of the spouses for his custody. It 
is extremely doubtful that under such circum-
stances a child of that age would have the stability 
and judgment to see through the maze and troubles 
and make a wise choice. In some instances it 
would be crnel to subject him to it and wholly 
unrealistic to regard his choice as absoluk 
Because of the foregoing, the court should be 
reluctant indeed to place this responsibility upon 
a small child, forcing him to face and cope with 
difficulties which the parents themselves have 
found insurmountable. This is especially so when 
a further effect is to rob the court itself of the 
role the law obviously intends it to play as arbiter 
and concilator of troubles which have proved too 
much for the family to deal with. 
It also must be remembered that any award 
of custody made by the court must necessarily be 
an integral part of the over-all adjustment of the 
family situation. The provision by way of sup-
port money or property settlement, and the values 
to be found in children being together, are con-
sidered by the court in judging what is best for 
the welfare of the entire family. This could all 
18 
be lost if the choice were dependent entirely upon 
the whim or caprice of a 10-year-old child." 
We need not consider these sections of the Statute 
' however, because they have both been amended to read 
as follows: 
Laws of Utah, 1969 - P. 320 and 330, Sec. 30-3-5: 
Dispositio·n of property and children - Contimt-
ing jurisdiction. 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court 
may make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable. The 
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders with re-
spect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their 
support and maintenance, or the distribution of 
the property as shall be reasonable and neces-
sary." 
30-3-10: Custody of children in case of separation. 
"In any case of separation of husband and 
wife having minor children, or whenever a mar-
riage is declared void o·r dissolved the court shall 
make such order for the future care and custody 
of the minor children as it may deem just the 
proper. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the 
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards 
of each of the parties and the natural presump-
tion that the mother is best suited to care for 
young children. The court may inquire of the 
children and take into consideration the children's 
desires regarding the future custody; however, 
such expressed desires shall not be controlling 
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and the court may, nevertheless, determine the 
children's custody otherwise." 
We respectfully call to the attention of the Court the 
language of the above new statute. 
In this case the evidence is clear that this mother 
has been an honest, devoted parent, during the infancy 
of these boys. There is no evidence of any misconduct 
on her part. It further appears that the father has an 
interest in the boys and a desire to give them all the 
necessary things they need during their growing period. 
However, there appears on a number of occasions, a 
disposition on the part of the Plaintiff to poison the 
boys against their mother and to influence them to come 
with him rather than to obey the Order of the Court. 
When he brought the boys in August to the home 
of the Plaintiff and there told her the boys had some-
thing to tell her, he knew that he was disobeying the 
Order of the Court and so conducted himself for only 
one purpose, and that was to discredit her with the 
boys and to encourage them to get away from her and 
come and live with him. He did not make any attempt 
to discourage the boys in their statements that they 
would not abide by the ruling of the Court, but by his 
conduct he in fact encouraged the boys to disobey the 
Order of the Court. It is further evident that the running 
away of the boys on September 4 and their having been 
received in the apartment of the sister of Rogers' wife, 
just had to be planned. The language of the boy, Kim, 
that he "needs a father" (Tr. 118) and that "there is 
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nothing in common" referring to his rdation with De-
fendant's new husband, is not the language of a thirteen 
year-old boy, but is the transplant of an anxious father 
who is helping him to persuade the Court to carry out 
his personal whim. It is apparent that these desires of 
the boys have been further brought about by the appar-
ent financial position of the Plaintiff's home as against 
the Defendant's home. This, of course, should never enter 
into a decision of this kind. The fact that the boys have 
been raised in a rather modest home, as against the 
Plaintiff's more elaborate housing, should not be a factor 
in determining who should have the custody. The fact 
that the Plaintiff is apparently more able to provide 
recreational facilities in the form of motor boats, 
campers, and sports cars, also should never be considered 
m determining the welfare of these children. 
We respectfully submit that the Plaintiff, as father 
of these children, has gone out of his way to deliberately 
flout the order of the Court. For him to take these little 
boys in August to the home of the Defendant and tell her 
"The boys have ·some·thing to tell you," and then stand 
by while these little boys told their mother that they 
were not coming home, could indicate only a cool, calcu-
lating, and deliberate plan on the part of the Plaintiff 
to violate the Order (Tr. 46). Thereafter, he in August 
admittedly registered the children in schools within his 
own district which is further proof that at no time did 
he intend to carry out the provisions of the Order that 
Defendant have custody during the school months. He 
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knew what the Order was and he set about to violate 
iht· sume by first poisoning the children's minds and 
i l!en·af ter assisting them by registering ti1em in schools 
within his district. On September 3rd when Mr. Andrews 
drove the boys to get their clothing, they remained in the 
lw m;e for 17 minutes. When thev came out to his car . ' 
tht'y had with them their musical instruments and a shirt 
apiece (Tr. 101). We submit that this is further proof 
of Plaintiff's plan to induce the children to run away 
on fat' next morning and thereby violate the Court's 
order. 
Although Plaintiff testified that he had not run 
Defendant down to the children, he told the boys she 
was an adulteress, on more than one occasion (Tr. 24-37-
114). For this contemptuous conduct and his further 
participation and assistance in helping the boys run away 
and secreting from their mother, the Court awarded him 
the permanent cutsody of the children with only over-
night visits to the Defendant. 
Thereafter, the Plaintiff gloatingly let Defendant 
have the children only at his convenience until Defendant 
on October 14, 1969, had the Court determine and fix a 
definite time when Defendant might visit with the chil-
dren over night. 
Interesting remarks along this line were made by 
the Court when counsel told the Court that in fairness 
the Defendant would have them overnight only once a 
month (Tr. 157) and then at Plaintiff's convenience, 
(Tr. 156) as follows: 
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''l\1R. HUGGIN8: We have one or two items 
hPrP to consider also, yonr Honor. 
First of all, thPse youngsters are old enough 
that their wishes should be given some weight. 
THE COURT: Well, they can't get ont of 
their visitation right. That's for sure. 
l\1R. HUGGINS: No. Bnt there must be 
some reason or some fairness to this thinking 
behind the mother and the father and the children 
themselves. 
Now we can't force those youngsters to like 
or dislike someone, by an order of court, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Yon can't force them except 
to win them. 
MR. HUGGINS: Well, this is possible. 
THE COURT: And this fellow wants them 
the way he wants them, and they go along. And 
then you come here and say it1s the kids' fault. 
Well it isn't. It's this fellow's fault. It's not the 
fault of the boys. 
MR. HUGGINS: No, I don't think that's 
exactly right, your honor. 
THE COURT: There isn't any question about 
it. He's planned it that way. 
It seems apparent that on October 14, 1969, the Court 
became aware of the attitude of Plaintiff to deprive De· 
f endant, the mother of the children, of having any defin· 
ite visitation period and that they wanted her to have 
them only at the will and convenience of Plaintiff. The 
Court then told counsel Plaintiff had "planned it that 
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way." This Plaintiff has been obsessed with the idea 
that h1:c would have the custody of these boys by one 
or another, regardless of what may be in their 
best interest. This in substance is and was Defendant's 
entire complaint about the ruling of the Court. 
We submit that it was never nor is it now the inten-
tion of the legislature to, in amending this statute, leave 
the matter of the custody of the children either to the 
children themselves nor to permit the parents to compete 
for their custody. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that in this case the 
Court was willing to follow the expressed wishes of the 
children even though there was no evidence of miscon-
duct on the part of defendant. Further, the Court was 
willing to yield to the wishes of the boys after their 
refusal to obey the order of the Court, and after they 
deliberately disobeyed the Order. This Order was also 
made after the evidence disclosed that Plaintiff had reg-
istered the boys in schools in his own District in August, 
knowing full well that the Order of the Court gave the 
custody back to Defendant during the school months, 
commencing September 1. Plaintiff had deliberately 
planned and connived to get the custody from Defendant 
and to aid the boys in avoiding the order of the Court. 
The Court has erroneously permitted Plaintiff to 
force the custody change upon the Court when there 
was nothing to justify such change, except the whim of 
the .rnung boys and the dPsigning tactics of tlw Plaintiff 
who deliberately planned the events as herein described 
that led to the Court's Order awarding permanent 
tody to Plaintiff. 
vVe submit such conduct should n<>ver be condoned, 
especially where it does not appear that the best inter-
ests of tlw children are served by such a ruling. 
Th Court had carefully considered the desires of the 
boys and what was for their best interests at the June 
hearing. This gave them summer custody to the father 
with overnight week-end visits to the mother during the 
summer months and the reverse during the school term 
This is a fair and reasonable order and takes into con-
sideration the desires of the boys plus the natural pre-
sumption that the mother is best suited to care for young 
children. This Order should have continued and should 
now stand as in the best interests of the children. 
RPspectfnlly submitted, 
LA MAR DUNCAN 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
